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The Proper Work of the Intellect 
 
 
The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work....[and] the proper work of the intellect is 
truth…. 
 
[Of] the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad 
state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual). 
 
- Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk VI, sec. 2. 
 
 
 
There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal 
or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error.  
This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is 
an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is 
at heart two distinct goals that are in tension with one another. This paper will look more closely at 
the standard way of understanding the truth goal, drawing out both its explicit and implicit features. 
My aim will be to show that the standard way of understanding the truth goal is deeply mistaken, to 
propose and defend an alternative model, and to show how this alternative model restores the unity 
of the goal and its potential to ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief. 
 
1. Preliminaries 
 
Talk of the standard model of the truth goal might seem retrograde. Perhaps as recently as two 
decades ago, the goal could have been uncontroversially stated as that of believing what is true and 
not believing what is false. But these days this formulation has been edged out by a variety of more 
subtle constructions. The goal might instead be that of believing all of the true propositions and 
none of the false propositions that we are capable of grasping. Or perhaps the goal really concerns 
propositions that we entertain, or that we are curious about, or that involve matters of practical importance. 
There is, one might think, no standard model of the truth goal, but only a plethora of distinct and 
competing conceptions. 
This line of thought is mistaken, however. Each of these is a conception of some quite 
different goal: the goal of believing the truth and nothing but the truth with regard to some 
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restricted domain of propositions. However interesting such goals may be, none is the truth goal, 
any more than the goal of being kind to every compatriot is the goal of being kind to everyone. In 
other words, although I will focus on an unrestricted goal and discuss “the standard model” of this 
goal, what I will allege is standard is not that the goal is unrestricted but rather a certain way of 
thinking about that goal. To say that the goal is unrestricted is merely to say which goal it is. 
There are three reasons to focus on the unrestricted truth goal and on how it is understood. 
First, because in many cases philosophers have been concerned to articulate other, distinct goals 
because the prevailing understanding of the truth goal is deeply mistaken. I will defend this claim in 
more detail as the paper develops, but in brief, the standard way of thinking of the truth goal 
misconstrues what it is for a person to fulfill the truth goal to a greater degree, and consequently 
many epistemologists have found the truth goal implausible as the epistemic, or even as an 
epistemic, goal.  Second, the features of the standard model of the truth goal that I will identify and 
criticize can also be found in models of other, restricted goals. I will not be able to elaborate on this 
claim in detail, but it should be clear from the discussion to come that the problems I identify are 
not unique to the standard understanding of the truth goal. If we can achieve a better 
understanding of that goal, we will be better placed to understand other, restricted goals we may be 
interested in for this or that good reason. Finally, as I said above, the standard model of the truth 
goal is one that leaves it unable to serve as the ground of an epistemic normativity worth having. If 
we understand the truth goal as we should, this problem dissolves. 
 
 
2. The Standard Model of the Truth Goal 
 
There are two main aspects to the standard model of the truth goal. The first is that the goal is 
taken to have two distinct elements, while the second is a certain picture of what it is to satisfy the 
goal to a greater and lesser degree. I will discuss each in turn, and then show how taken together 
they have serious consequences for the prospect of the truth goal serving as the foundation of 
epistemic normativity. 
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2.1 The Two Elements of the Truth Goal 
On the standard understanding of the truth goal, it is taken to have two distinct elements. As 
Marian David puts it: 
Let us characterize the truth-goal, somewhat loosely, as the goal of believing truths and not 
believing falsehoods…. Note that the goal has two parts, a positive part (believing truths) and a 
negative part (not believing falsehoods). The label 'truth-goal' is less than ideal because it de-
emphasizes the negative part. (2001: 153) 
 
This claim has become a platitude that introduces discussions of the truth goal. It was not always 
so. James had to argue for, or at least insist upon, the distinction between what David calls the 
positive and negative parts of the truth goal: 
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion—ways entirely different, 
and yet ways about whose difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown 
very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error, – these are our first and great 
commandments as would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical 
commandment, they are two separable laws. (1969: 203) 
 
As everyone recognizes, these dual elements can be written as a single goal: 
 
believe p if and only if p 
 
or: 
 
believe exactly the true propositions 
 
but this doesn't change the fact that, at least typically, they are thought of as two distinct goals: 
 
if p, then believe p 
if not p, then do not believe p 
 
 
2.2 Satisfying the Truth Goal to Greater and Lesser Degree 
 
The second aspect of the standard model of the truth goal is less explicit. That is that the degree to 
which one satisfies it is given by, roughly, the ratio of true beliefs to truths balanced against the 
ratio of false beliefs to falsehoods. We can put it more precisely as the idea, implicit rather than 
explicit in the standard picture of the truth goal, that one satisfies the first element: 
if p, then believe p 
 
to whatever extent the truths one believes comprise all the truths there are, and one satisfies the 
second element: 
if not p, then do not believe p 
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to the inverse of whatever extent the falsehoods one believes comprise all the falsehoods there are. 
The basic idea is that there are some number of true propositions and one satisfies the first element 
incrementally as one comes to believe them; with each new true belief, a true proposition moves 
from the 'true but unbelieved' ledger to the 'true and believed' ledger. Similarly for the second 
element: there are some number of false propositions and as one comes to believe them, one 
satisfies the second element less; with each new false belief, a false proposition moves from the 
'false and unbelieved' ledger to the 'false and believed' ledger. 
These two aspects of the standard model of the truth goal raise or are bound up with two 
further issues. The first is that of weighing how much satisfaction of the overall, two-part goal is 
determined by how much one satisfies the first element and by how much one satisfies the second 
element. To say that one satisfies the first element of the truth goal more with each new truth 
believed, and that one satisfies the second element less with each new falsehood believed, leaves 
unsettled the issue of how these ledgers balance against each other. One might think the degree to 
which one fulfills the positive element makes a greater contribution to how much the goal is 
satisfied than does the degree to which one fulfills the negative element. Or one might think the 
degree to which one fulfills the negative element makes the greater contribution. Or one might 
think the elements are perfectly balanced, so that the degree to which one satisfies the overall goal 
is a simple average or sum. 
It would be a mistake to think that only the equal contribution view is coherent. One might 
be attracted to the simple sum view in the case of the two elements of the truth goal because there 
is a very obvious symmetry or complementarity to the idea of believing what's true and not 
believing what's false. But we can recognise this while realizing it does not settle the issue. How 
much each element contributes is an additional aspect, something that is not internal to the goal so 
long as it is interpreted as that of believing what is true and not believing what is false. James 
recognized this, and recognized that how they are balanced makes a very big difference to the 
assessment of one's epistemic position: 
Believe truth! Shun error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing 
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between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life. We may regard 
the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the 
other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its 
chance. (1969: 204) 
 
This issue has been recognized, but there is another that is subtler and perhaps harder to see. 
Merely saying that the truth goal consists in the sub-goals of: 
if p, then believe p 
if not p, then do not believe p 
 
leaves open whether the satisfaction or fulfillment curve of each of these elements is regular, and if 
it is, why it is that way. To illustrate what is at issue, suppose for simplicity there are 50 truths and at 
time t1 Priya believes none of them. She then comes to believe one of those truths, so she believes 
1/50th of the true propositions. A little later, she believes a second of the truths, such that she 
believes 2/50ths of the true propositions. Then she comes to believe a third truth, so she believes 
3/50ths of the true propositions. Eventually she believes 25 of these truths, or half of the true 
propositions. (For simplicity we will ignore the negative element and assume that she has refrained 
from forming any false beliefs.) It is clear that in the scenario as described, Priya satisfies the truth 
goal more at the end than at the beginning. But there is still an intelligible question concerning 
whether her progress toward satisfying the goal was regular. That is, does believing an additional 
truth make the same degree of contribution toward how much one satisfies the truth goal 
independently of the degree to which one already satisfies the truth goal at the point of acquiring 
that belief? Or does the degree of contribution made by an additional true belief grow or diminish 
as one comes closer to satisfying the truth goal (and if so, is the rate of growth or diminution fixed 
or exponential)? Or is there perhaps an irregular pattern, or no pattern at all? In the same vein, one 
can also ask whether each true or false belief makes the same degree of positive or negative 
contribution as any other. Do some make more of a contribution and some less? Or does a person 
satisfy the truth goal more to such-and-such degree with each new true belief, regardless of which 
belief it is, and satisfy it less to such-and-such degree with each false belief, regardless of which 
belief it is? And finally, distinct from this, does a particular belief’s contribution to a person’s 
satisfying (or failing to satisfy) one of the elements of the truth goal vary depending on what else 
 6 
the subject believes? These are all intelligible questions in want of an answer. Moreover, we need 
not only an answer to these questions, but an explanation of the answer, a story that makes 
intelligible why the answer is what it is.1 
These questions have not been asked. We have already said enough to see, however, that the 
standard model of the truth goal does take a stand on these questions, albeit an implicit and 
undefended one. It takes the progress toward satisfying the truth goal to be regular, both in the 
sense that any given belief makes the contribution it does regardless of what else or how much one 
truly or falsely believes, and in the sense that each belief makes the same positive or negative 
contribution as any other. This follows from the fact it construes progress toward satisfying the 
truth goal by appeal to the ratios of true beliefs to truths and false beliefs to falsehoods. It isn’t clear 
what is supposed to justify this, as it is an additional element beyond the mere statement of the goal 
as that of believing what’s true and not believing what’s false. To be sure, it might be natural to 
think the degree of contribution is indifferent to the proposition believed and to what else is 
believed. First Priya knew nothing, then she acquired one truth’s worth of truth, then two truths’ 
worth, then three truths’ worth, and so on. But natural is not the same as correct, and we should 
want an explanation. 
 
2.3 The Truth Goal and Epistemic Normativity 
Both aspects of the standard model of the truth goal will be broadly familiar. Nonetheless it is 
worth considering an example of the model at work in philosophy. The example illustrates not only 
both aspects of the standard model, but the deep consequences of construing the truth goal in this 
way.  
Consider Wayne Riggs’s paper “Balancing our epistemic goals” (2003). Riggs begins by 
noting that “There seems to be little disagreement within epistemology these days about the view 
that something like ‘truth,’ ‘having true beliefs,’ or ‘gaining truth’ is our major, perhaps even our 
                                                            
1 One might find this demand unreasonable. If one of the sub-goals is {if p, then believe p}, then surely (one 
wants to say) a person satisfies that sub-goal more with each new true belief, and one satisfies it more to the 
same degree. But this is to insist on an answer to a question without being willing to ask it. 
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only, purely epistemic goal.” (2003: 343) He then points to the first aspect of the standard model, 
the duality stressed by James, saying: 
But, as James points out, we also value avoiding false beliefs (or perhaps better: we disvalue 
having false beliefs). Unfortunately, pursuit of these two goals can pull us in opposite 
directions. Concern to avoid having false beliefs naturally prompts skepticism and caution, 
while the desire to accumulate true beliefs urges us toward acceptance, though not to the 
point of recklessness. (2003: 343) 
 
What follows is an extended analogy between cognition and a widget factory, which is worth 
quoting at length: 
MegaCorp, Inc. is a multinational company specializing in the manufacture, sales, and service 
of widgets. MegaCorp has production facilities all over the world, each with its own quality 
control inspector to ensure that the standards handed down from company HQ are met.  
At this year’s management retreat, the high officers of the company decided on two 
goals for the upcoming year. First, to put a great many operative widgets on the market, and 
second, to put no defective widgets on the market. In order to facilitate these goals, the CEO 
had a memo distributed to the quality control inspectors of all production facilities advising 
them of the goals and of their importance.  
However, the CEO was worried about how motivated the inspectors would be to 
follow the guidelines rigorously. Therefore, she sent out another memo, announcing that all 
quality control inspectors would be evaluated in the following year regarding how 
successfully they met the company’s goals. After the year was over, the CEO looked over the 
performance records of the inspectors in order to evaluate them. Two inspectors, in 
particular, caught her eye. One of these, Mr. Nervous, was notable for having put no 
defective widgets on the market. Ms. Careless, on the other hand, an inspector at a different 
plant, allowed thousands of widgets to leave the factory floor that were defective. Here seem 
to be paradigm cases of inspectors that deserved promotion and dismissal, respectively.  
Just as the CEO was about to write memos to this effect, the Vice President in charge 
of Production barged irritatedly into her office. “Look at these production figures,” he said 
angrily. The plant whose records he showed her were from the plant managed by Mr. 
Nervous. It turned out that he sent out only a single widget in the whole year! The sum 
output of his factory was 1 widget. “Here, this is more like it,” the VP said with satisfaction. 
This time the VP showed her the records from Ms. Careless’s plant. Her factory had sent out 
100,000 widgets this year. The VP informed the CEO that this was more than any other 
plant had produced that year. “That inspector deserves a promotion for sure,” said the VP 
on his way out of the CEO’s office.  
Putting all this information together, the CEO discovers the following. Mr. Nervous 
allowed 0 defective widgets on the market, but also allowed only 1 operative widget. Ms. 
Careless, on the other hand, allowed 10,000 (let us say) defective widgets on the market, but 
also allowed 90,000 operative widgets. So which of the two has done the better job this year? 
While Ms. Careless is not, perhaps, a model inspector, neither is Mr. Nervous. It is an open 
question which of the two has done better for the company. It all depends upon the relative 
weights of the two goals that MegaCorp is pursuing.  
The parallels between this scenario and the epistemic evaluations of cognizers are 
obvious, yet instructive. (2003: 343-4) 
 
As Riggs points out, a factory that produces widgets can be assessed by how many operative 
widgets it produces and by how many defective widgets it produces. Because these dimensions of 
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assessment come apart, to assess how a factory is doing overall with regard to widget-production 
one needs to assign a specific weight to each dimension, and a principled reason for assigning the 
weights that one does. 
As Riggs emphasizes, the parallel with epistemic evaluation is obvious. We can assess 
cognizers by how much they get right, and by how much they get wrong. Once we’ve done this, 
however, there is a further question: how to assess them overall: 
Finally, we come to the most fundamental question posed above. “What is the correct 
weighting of the relative values of our two cognitive goals?” Do we, in general, value having 
truths more than we disvalue believing falsehoods, or vice versa? Or are they completely on a 
par with each other? Where are we even to look for answers to such questions?  (2003: 349, 
italics in original) 
 
The wording seems to run together the question of what the correct weighting is with the question 
of what we actually value or care about. I take it though that the former question is his real focus 
and it is certainly ours.  
Riggs argues that there are two strategies we could adopt to determine the correct weighting 
of the relative values of what he calls our two cognitive goals. We could accept that believing more 
truths and fewer falsehoods are the ultimate epistemic goals, and then look for an overarching, non-
epistemic goal to ground a relative weighting of these epistemic goals (e.g., the goal of being able to 
act in ways that best serve our practical interests). Or we could look for a deeper, genuinely 
epistemic goal that is not essentially veridic or alethic, not ultimately the goal of believing the truth 
and nothing but (perhaps, he suggests, the goal of acquiring understanding is such a goal). On 
either strategy, we should notice, the truth goal retreats in importance, unable to serve as the 
foundation of an epistemic normativity worth having. On the first strategy the truth goal remains 
the ground of epistemic normativity, but epistemic normativity contracts severely, to the point 
where there is no epistemically normative correct answer to the question of whether one weighting 
of true versus false beliefs is better than another. On the second strategy, there may be an 
epistemically normative correct answer to the question of what relative weighting of each goal is 
best, but that answer won’t rest on a connection to the good of believing more truth and less 
falsehood. If anything, as Riggs notes, on this second strategy the epistemic value or disvalue of 
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believing truths and falsehoods might rest on this other, non-veridic good. 
Looking at this discussion by Riggs is valuable for several reasons. First, it illustrates the 
prevalence of both aspects of the standard model of the truth goal – that it consists in two distinct, 
independent goals, and that one satisfies each goal in regular increments as one acquires truths and 
avoids falsehoods. But the discussion also shows some of how the standard model of the truth goal 
leads us astray.  I will defend this claim in more detail later, but note for now that Riggs’s 
pessimistic reflections on whether the truth goal is suited to serve as the ultimate ground of an 
epistemic normativity worth having rest on his construing the truth goal as decomposing into two 
distinct independent goals, each of which is served incrementally by the acquisition or avoidance of 
beliefs. Finally, the extended analogy wherein human cognition is compared to a widget factory 
illustrates the firm grip in epistemology of a conception of belief on which how much a person 
believes truly, and how much falsely, is a matter of how many true and false beliefs that person has, 
just as the output of a factory consists in some number of good and bad widgets. This is part and 
parcel of the standard model of the truth goal and at the very heart of where it goes wrong. 
 
 
3. How is the Standard Model Wrong? 
 
In this section, I will argue that we have gone astray, and that the standard way of understanding 
the truth goal is deeply mistaken.2  
 
3.1 Counting the uncountable 
 
For simplicity, we will consider just the positive goal and focus on someone with no false beliefs. 
According to the standard model of the truth goal, that person fulfils the positive element of the 
truth goal to a greater degree to the extent that the true propositions she believes comprise all the 
true propositions there are. There are two different ways we could understand this. First, by appeal 
to the notion of a ratio: Take the set of true propositions and sort them into two subsets, the set of 
true propositions believed by her and the set of true propositions not believed by her, and then 
compare the cardinality of these sets. How she is doing, vis-a-vis the truth goal or at least its 
                                                            
2 The following two subsections draw on [removed for anonymous review]. 
 10 
positive aspect, is determined by this ratio. Alternatively, we could simply look at how many of the 
true propositions she fails to believe: the fewer she fails to believe, the better, and the absolute 
measure of how she is doing vis-a-vis the truth goal (or its positive aspect) is given by the 
cardinality of the set of true propositions she fails to believe. 
Whichever method we choose, however, we run into a problem: there are too many true 
propositions for this method to work. Consider, first, that if there is a set of true propositions, then 
its cardinality is at least as great as the cardinality of the real numbers. Hence there will be 
uncountably many true propositions the person fails to believe. But then it does not make any sense 
to talk about there being a ratio of true propositions believed to true propositions; the idea that the 
person's true beliefs comprise some extent of the true propositions is unintelligible. Moreover, 
since the cardinality of the set of true propositions she fails to believe does not change (it is always 
the cardinality of the reals), it is simply false to say that as she acquires true beliefs, the cardinality of 
the true propositions she fails to believe becomes smaller. In either case, although it may make 
sense to say that she believes more, or fewer, truths than she did before, it does not make sense to 
say that she believes more, or fewer, of the truths than she did before. 
One may think this objection merely helps refine the account. What we should want, this 
response says, is an account that takes a cognizer to satisfy the positive element of the truth goal to 
a greater degree if and only if she believes a greater number of true propositions. What matters, in 
other words, is sheer numbers rather than ratio. This is more than a minor amendment however. It 
abandons the idea that a typical person, at a time, satisfies the truth goal to some degree. It allows 
that the person satisfies the truth goal more or less than some other person, but not that there is 
some degree to which she satisfies it herself. This would permit comparative ranking against other 
cognizers, but not an absolute standard vis-à-vis the goal itself. In other words, there would be no 
fact of the matter concerning how much she satisfied the goal. If the degree to which a person 
satisfies the goal determines the degree to which a person is an epistemic success, then there would 
be no fact of the matter concerning the degree to which she is an epistemic success. 
But there is another problem with this refinement. Consider a cognizer who believes of each 
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point on some one inch line, that it is a point. Now consider a cognizer who believes, of each point 
on some one inch line, that it is a point, and of everything in the Encyclopedia Britannica, that it is 
true. The second cognizer comes closer to satisfying the truth goal. Yet the cardinality of the set of 
true propositions she believes is identical (and there isn't even a subset relation, so long as the lines 
are different). So the 'sheer numbers' approach fails to even capture the thought that she is doing 
better than the other cognizer vis-a-vis the goal.  
The same points hold if we consider the negative sub-goal: if a proposition is false, then do 
not believe it. If there is a set of false propositions, then its cardinality is at least as large as the 
cardinality of the reals. Hence if you have 8 false beliefs and I have 408 false beliefs, the cardinality 
of the set of false propositions you have managed to avoid believing is identical to the cardinality of 
the set of false propositions I have managed to avoid believing. To be sure, you believe fewer false 
propositions than I do. But you do not believer fewer of the false propositions. Moreover there are 
pairs of possible cognizers each of whom believes continuum-many false propositions, and yet one 
is worse off vis-a-vis the negative goal than the other. One might believe of every point on some 
one inch line that it could have had a colour. Another might believe of every point on some one 
inch line that it could have had a colour, and that everything in the Encyclopedia Britannica is false. 
The cardinality of the set of false propositions believed by the first cognizer is identical to the 
cardinality of the set of false propositions believed by the second cognizer, but the first has done 
better vis-à-vis the truth goal. 
 
3.2 What to Count? 
The above arguments may strike some readers as unconvincing, in that they turn on considerations 
about the cardinality of infinite sets that have an air of mystery about them. I do not think this 
reaction is warranted, but let's consider, nonetheless, a distinct set of problems for the standard 
model of the truth goal. There are several ways to develop the line of argument. One way is to 
consider the notion of a truth or a falsehood as implicit in the standard model of the truth goal. 
What is the notion? There has been little explicit discussion of this question with regard to the truth 
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goal, but it is clear that the epistemologists who have thought about the truth goal and endorsed the 
standard model of it have in mind something like what is expressed by an ordinary declarative 
sentence of natural language. It will be useful here to draw examples from classic discussions of 
why, allegedly, truth is not our principal or only epistemic goal. Consider these well-known 
passages:3 
The most obvious pure epistemic goal is truth….But, in my judgment, truth is not the 
important part of the story….The trouble is that most of the truths that can be acquired in 
these ways are boring. Nobody is interested in the minutiae of the shapes and colors of the 
objects in your vicinity, the temperature fluctuations in your microenvironment, the infinite 
number of disjunctions you can generate with your favourite true statement as one disjunct, 
or the probabilities of the events in the many chance setups you can contrive with objects in 
your vicinity. What we want is significant truth. (Kitcher 1993: 93-94) 
 
What is the 323rd entry in the Wichita, Kansas, telephone directory? Who placed sixth in the 
women's breast stroke at the 1976 Summer Olympics? What was the full name of Domenico 
Scarlatti's maternal grandmother? (Goldman 1999: 88) 
 
If random telephone numbers do not elicit a wide enough yawn, consider a randomly 
selected cubic foot of the Sahara. Here is a trove of facts, of the form grain x is so many 
millimeters in direction D from grain y, than which few can be of less interest. (Sosa 2000: 
49) 
 
From these passages we can extract the following examples of what a truth or falsehood, for the 
purposes of reflecting on the truth goal, is thought to look like: 
There is a blue cube to my left 
It is slightly warmer in this room than it was a few minutes ago 
Snow is white v p v q v r v s (ad infinitum) 
The cell is the basic structural, functional and biological unit of all known living organisms 
The 323rd entry in the Wichita, Kansas phone book is ‘Gale, Dorothy. 1900 Emerald Drive. 
316-688-1945’ 
Gold is an element 
Maryna Yurchenia of Russia placed sixth in the 100 metre women’s breaststroke at the 1976 
Summer Olympics 
Space and time emerged together 13.799±0.021 billion years ago with a fixed amount of 
energy and matter that has become less dense as the Universe has expanded 
Domenico Scarlatti’s maternal grandmother was named Sicuramente Non Questo 
Grain of sand x is 4 inches in direction 289.452343 from grain of sand y 
 
The problem, however, is that if this is what is meant by a proposition, or a truth, or a falsehood, 
then it is just implausible that one makes regular incremental progress toward or away from 
satisfying the truth goal as one comes to believe truths or falsehoods. Some clearly contain more 
information than others. For example, compare these propositions: 
                                                            
3 Haack 1993 makes the same point, but without giving examples.  
 13 
Jane is female. 
Mark is a bachelor. 
 
For simplicity, let's assume that 'Jane' and 'Mark' function purely referentially, having no descriptive 
content. It is clear that the second proposition says more about Mark than the first one says about 
Jennifer. Or, more generally, the second proposition says more (full stop) than the first. For just 
this reason, if both propositions are true, then coming to believe that Mark is a bachelor, from a 
position of total ignorance regarding Mark, makes more of a difference to how much one satisfies 
the truth goal than does coming to believe that Jane is female, from a position of total ignorance 
regarding Jane. The standard model of the truth goal would certainly mandate believing each of 
them. It’s not easy to see, however, how it can capture the evident fact that believing the second 
one is better, vis-a-vis the most intuitive sense of what the truth goal is, than believing the first. 
With this particular example, it’s tempting to say that the standard model of the truth goal can 
capture the fact it's better – and not only capture, explain and predict. After all, one wants to say, 
when a person believes that Mark is a bachelor they ipso facto believe that Mark is male, that Mark 
is unmarried, and that Mark is an adult. In other words, they believe three truths4 rather than merely 
one and that – just as the standard model would explain – is why they fulfill the truth goal to a 
greater degree. The problem with this response, however, is that its promise is illusory. For 
consider this list of ordinary truths: 
Jane is female. 
Mark is a bachelor. 
It is raining. 
   
Intuitively, believing that Mark is a bachelor satisfies the truth goal more than does believing that 
Jane is female. The response we’re considering alleges that it can explain this by pointing to the fact 
that the second truth is really (or at least involves) three distinct truths, whereas the first is merely 
one. But what of the third? How many truths is that? Should we say it is exactly one, on the 
grounds that it doesn't wear any complexity on its face? We should not, because we can also 
compare that truth with this one: 
There is precipitation now. 
                                                            
4 Or 4, or 5, or 6, depending on the mereology endorsed. 
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 If ‘it is raining’ were exactly one truth, then ‘there is precipitation now’, which seems to say less 
about the world, would seem to have to be less than one.5 That can’t be right. 
The problem with the response we’re imagining is that it is tempting only in a very small 
range of cases, those relevantly similar to the ‘Mark is a bachelor’ example. When we consider the 
full range of truths and falsehoods expressed by ordinary sentences of natural language, the promise 
dissipates. It isn't merely that we have no idea how to even begin deciding how many truths each of 
(e.g.) ‘there is a blue cube to my left’ or ‘the cell is the basic structural, functional and biological unit 
of all known living organisms’ contains. It is that it is hard to see that, even in principle, a person 
who believes them believes ipso facto some number of simple truths, in the sense that each of these 
truths is or decomposes into some number of simple truths. 
This leaves us with a significant puzzle concerning the standard model of the truth goal. 
What is believing more truth or more truths supposed to be, according to that model? We know the 
answer is something that has to do with the cardinality of truths believed, each belief being a sort of 
widget produced by cognition. But we also know, after reflection, that insofar as we think of 
individual beliefs or individual truths by appeal to the individual sentences that express them – as 
we do and perhaps must – individual beliefs and individual truths are not equimagnitudinous. Just 
as individual sentences differ in how much they say about the world, the individual truths expressed 
by such sentences, and the individual beliefs we would use such sentences to attribute to ourselves 
and others, differ in how much of reality they represent. Hence the puzzle: According to the 
standard model of the truth goal, and setting aside the issue of weighting the positive and negative 
aspects, one satisfies the truth goal more when one has a greater number of true beliefs and a lesser 
number of false beliefs, or to put the claim slightly differently, when one believes a greater number 
of truths and a lesser number of falsehoods. But if we ought not to count truths and falsehoods as 
expressed in ordinary sentences of natural language – as only a little reflection tells us we shouldn’t 
or even cannot – then what should we count? What is there to count? This is a serious problem. 
                                                            
5 If one worries that ‘there is precipitation now’ actually says more, in that it includes the truth that there is at 
least one non-rain way of being precipitation, notice that this would prove the point I am trying to make, just 
in a different way. 
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4.  What, then, is the correct model? 
 
The standard model construes the truth goal as two distinct goals. It takes it that some other, 
external factor has to be imposed to generate a balance between them. And it fails, as a model, 
because when you drill down to the details, it isn’t possible to sustain the idea that progress toward 
each sub-goal is a matter of the number of truths and falsehoods believed. Can we do better? 
I think we can, and that there is a way of preserving the core idea behind the standard model 
of the truth goal while avoiding its mistakes. The correct model must, it should go without saying, 
be one on which believing truths and disbelieving falsehoods is central. But it has to do this in a 
way that makes intelligible how one can satisfy the goal to a greater and lesser extent. 
Here is the model in outline: The truth goal should be construed not by appeal to the idea of 
maximizing the cardinality of the set of truths you believe while minimizing the cardinality of the 
set of falsehoods you believe. Rather, it should be construed by appeal to the idea of increasing the 
similarity between the world-as-represented and the world, or to put the idea in more familiar 
language, between your picture of the world and the world. To be sure, true and false beliefs matter, 
for generally speaking true beliefs increase the similarity and false beliefs decrease the similarity. But 
just as sharing property A can make more of a difference to how similar two objects are than does 
sharing property B, representing the world as being such that A is instantiated can make more of a 
difference to how much one’s picture of the world resembles the world than does representing the 
world as being such that B is instantiated. The mistake we have been making is to assume that 
because satisfying the truth goal involves having true and false beliefs, there is such a thing as the 
number of truths and falsehoods we believe and it’s the number of these that matters. But this is as 
wrong as the view that since being similar involves having properties in common, there is such a 
thing as the number of properties any two objects share and it’s the number of shared properties 
that matters. 
That’s the sketch. It is difficult to develop a more detailed model because many of the central 
issues such a model would need to resolve are among the most deeply contested in metaphysics and 
philosophy of language. I have in mind here not only questions about the nature of similarity, about 
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what it is and what makes for it, but also questions about the nature of properties, about the 
relation between predicates and properties, and about naturalness. We can illustrate the guiding 
idea, however, with an analogy, which I offer as a better way to think about cognition than the 
widget factory. 
Suppose MIT sponsors an engineering competition where the challenge is for teams to build 
an AI robot that will strive to duplicate some part of reality at 1:1 scale, say some 1 cubic mile as it 
was in the first minute of 2018 EST. For example, if the centre of the cube is located at the summit 
of Chimborazo, the point on the earth’s surface furthest from its centre, at some fixed angle relative 
to the earth, what is relevant is everything within that cubic mile – the glaciers and igneous rock, the 
microorganisms, the lichen and cruciferous plant species, and all the cold and quiet air that 
surrounds the summit and its upper slopes. The competition task is to build a robot that will 
duplicate this bit of the world as it was in the first minute of 2018 EST, where each robot has some 
set amount of time, say 5 years, to do this task. 
Fast forward five years. Three robots were entered and each has produced a physical object, 
or more precisely a dynamic system on a one-minute loop. Robot A has produced something that 
closely resembles a deflating football. Robot B has produced something that closely resembles the 
cubic mile centred on the summit of Chimborazo, with just the following differences: what is air is 
water, the rock is sedimentary rather than igneous, and in place of glaciers there is only mayonnaise. 
Robot C has produced something that closely resembles the cubic mile centred on the summit of 
Chimborazo, with just these differences: the mountain is a tiny bit smaller, say one millimetre less 
prominent, and the volume of air a tiny bit bigger to compensate. The judges at MIT have three 
prizes to award. A first place trophy, a second place plaque, a third place participation ribbon. I take 
it as very strongly intuitive that Robot C should get the trophy, Robot B the plaque, and Robot A 
the participation ribbon. The strange deflating football that Robot A produced bears little similarity 
to the cubic mile around the summit of Chimborazo; nice effort though. The mountain of just the 
right size, made by Robot B,  but of the wrong kind of rock, covered in mayonnaise rather than ice, 
and surrounded by water rather than air, is much more similar to the cubic mile around the summit 
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of Chimborazo than is the deflating football, but still goes substantially wrong. The object that 
Robot C produced, in contrast, stands out as very similar, as very close to being a duplicate. It’s not 
a perfect duplicate, to be sure, but boy is it close. 
What makes it the case that this is how the prizes should be distributed? Is it the number of 
properties that Robots A, B and C got right, and the number that each got wrong? At first glance we 
may find this tempting, but it is a familiar and widely accepted point about similarity between 
objects or worlds that similarity doesn’t reduce to the number of shared properties. Each of the 
objects the robots produced shares and fails to share infinitely many properties with the cubic mile 
around the summit of Chimborazo. Moreover, properties do not all make the same contribution to 
similarity – some make a much greater contribution than others, and some make perhaps no 
contribution at all. As Lewis memorably put both points: 
Because properties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. Any two things share 
infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many others. That is so whether the two 
things are perfect duplicates or utterly dissimilar. Thus properties do nothing to capture facts 
of resemblance…. Properties carve reality at the joints—and everywhere else as well. (1983: 
346) 
 
Consider, for example, an apple and an electron: they are quite dissimilar, but there are nonetheless 
infinitely many properties they share (being more than 1 second old, being more than 1.1 seconds 
old, being more than 1.11 seconds old, not to mention the infinitely many shared properties more 
gruesome than these). Consider now two oranges. They are quite similar, but they are much more 
similar by virtue of sharing the property of being a citrus fruit than they are by virtue of sharing the 
property of not being Jupiter. In the case of the robots, what we should say is that the robot that 
won the trophy did so because the object it produced was most similar, overall, to the cubic mile it 
was trying to duplicate. The robot that got the participation ribbon deserved to come in last 
because the object it produced was least similar. And the second-place robot’s object was 
somewhere in the middle. To be sure, we have no good theories of what such similarity consists in; 
that problem is as old as philosophy. But it is still the right answer. 
Let’s move closer now to the issue that concerns us, that of how the truth goal should be 
understood. Suppose in future years the competition committee decides that to reduce the carbon 
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footprint of the competition, the goal will be changed from that of duplicating an object in reality, 
by producing a perfectly similar object, to that of duplicating an object in thought, by producing a 
mental representation that perfectly resembles it, or that gets it exactly right. In other words, the AI 
robot doesn’t have to actually make a physical object, it only has to form beliefs about what the 
target cubic mile of the world is like. The cubic mile is again centred on the summit of Chimborazo 
and three robots enter the competition. One produces a mental representation according to which 
that cubic mile is represented as having exactly the properties that a deflating football has. A second 
produces a representation according to which that cubic mile has a mountain in it composed of 
sedimentary rock, topped with mayonnaise and covered in water. The third produces a mental 
representation that gets the cubic mile exactly right save a bit of inaccuracy about the height of the 
mountain and the volume of air. In other words, the three robots produce mental representations 
that correspond exactly, save being mental rather than real, to the physical objects produced the 
first time the competition ran. For every property each of those objects had, these robots 
respectively have beliefs that ascribe that property to the target cubic mile. 
How should the competition be judged this time? Is it by appeal to how many truths and 
falsehoods each robot represents? The problem with this story is that if the original objects 
produced the first time the competition ran each share, and fail to share, infinitely many properties 
with the cubic mile that surrounds the summit of Chimborazo, then the current robots, with their 
mental versions of these objects, each has infinitely many true and infinitely many false beliefs 
about that cubic mile. The number of truths and falsehoods believed, therefore, doesn’t capture the 
difference in the faithfulness with which each robot represents the target cubic mile. By that 
measure, they are doing equally well. Moreover, just as we recognise that the sharing of some 
properties makes more of a difference to how similar two objects are than does the sharing of other 
properties, we should recognise that the representing of an object as having certain properties 
makes more of a difference to how much one’s representation resembles that object than does the 
representing of that object as having other properties. This follows from the fact the robots in this 
competition have just as many true and false beliefs as one another, for the difference between 
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them therefore has to be not how many true and false beliefs they have, but which true and false 
beliefs they have. Recall also the two oranges we considered earlier: They both bear the properties 
of being a citrus fruit and of not being Jupiter, but they are more similar by virtue of sharing the 
former than they are by virtue of sharing the latter. If you form a mental representation of one of 
the oranges that includes the fact that it is not Jupiter and I form a mental representation of it that 
includes the fact that it is a citrus fruit, then by believing it is a citrus fruit – that is, in correctly 
ascribing to it the property of being a citrus fruit – I increase the similarity between the orange and 
my picture of it more than you do by believing that it is not Jupiter – that is, by correctly ascribing 
to it the property of not being Jupiter. By learning it is a citrus fruit, I close in on what it is. By 
learning it is not Jupiter, however, you are still almost wholly in the dark about what it is; for all you 
know, it could be anything that is not Jupiter, as wildly different in kind and nature as those are. 
Reflection on this competition does not yet tell us how the truth goal should be understood. 
We have one idea, that of increasing the number of truths believed and decreasing the number of 
falsehoods believed, and a different idea, that of increasing the similarity between object or world 
and one’s representation of the object or world. Why should we think this alternative conception is 
a better way to understand the truth goal, rather than just something else, some different thing 
entirely? There are three reasons. 
First, when we think about the truth goal in its most basic form, before it is interpreted by 
theory, it is the goal of getting the world right, of representing the world as it is and not as it is not. 
That notion more closely corresponds to the account on which the truth goal is a matter of 
increasing the similarity between your representation of the world and the world. This can be hard 
to see because we are very used to thinking of the truth goal in a way that is laden with theory, a 
way according to which serving the truth goal is a matter of having more true and fewer false 
beliefs. But this is why the example of the artificial intelligence competition is illuminating. We can 
make sense of the robots being unleashed on the world with the command to duplicate, as closely 
as possible, some part of the world. If that is their aim, then increasing similarity rather than 
maximizing the number of properties in common while minimizing the number of properties not 
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in common is the right way to understand their task. My claim now is that when we think about our 
most basic grasp on the truth goal, and about the environmentally friendly version of the 
competition, where the robots are asked to duplicate the cubic mile in thought rather than in reality, 
we can see that the robot who deserves to win that competition deserves to win because it has 
better served the truth goal. It was unleashed on the world, or more precisely a circumscribed part 
of it, and given the job of knowing it, of bringing the world or that part of it within its ken. One 
robot did a poor job of that, one a brilliant job of that, and one was somewhere in the middle. We 
could say that all three robots serve the truth goal equally well, and that, so far as the truth goal is 
concerned, the robot that represents the cubic mile as a deflating football is no better or worse than 
the robot who represents the cubic mile as it is save the mountain being a millimetre shorter and 
the volume of air correspondingly greater. We could say that, and insist that the goal of cognitive 
duplication, which distinguishes the robots, is something else, something that doesn’t have to do 
with the truth goal. But this doesn’t seem right. The cognitive duplication ideal just is the ideal of 
getting the world right, of representing the world as it is and not as it is not. 
A second reason, closely related to this, is that the similarity or resemblance of a 
representation to what it represents is properly understood as a veridical or alethic notion. Similarity 
between objects, and similarity between representations and objects, are both a matter of likeness; 
in both cases it is a notion of matching or closeness of fit. The similarity that holds between objects 
is not a matter of veridicality, however, since one object doesn’t represent another, at least in 
ordinary circumstances. But as soon as representation is brought into the picture, then the likeness 
or closeness of fit becomes veridical. To be sure, the only things that can be true or false, in the 
dominant sense of those words, are individual sentences, beliefs, or propositions.  But there is a 
broader, more inclusive notion of veridicality, which includes but is not exhausted by this narrower 
notion. This is the notion of faithfulness or fidelity to an original, and it is just this notion that is 
captured by the similarity approach to the truth goal. This is why the AI competition is an apt 
analogy. The objects the robots produce in the first version of the competition each stand in a 
certain similarity relation to the cubic mile around the summit of Chimborazo. If we construe those 
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objects as representations of that cubic mile, then the similarity relation qua object becomes a 
resemblance relation that holds qua representation. Each object qua representation faithfully 
represents the cubic mile to the same degree that the object qua object is similar to the cubic mile. 
The third reason we should think of this proposal as a way to understand the truth goal, 
rather than just some different thing entirely, is because it preserves the best part of the standard 
model of the truth goal while avoiding its mistakes. That model starts in the right place, by 
recognizing the central importance of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. But it errs in 
elevating this starting point to the content of the truth goal itself, in construing the truth goal as 
nothing more than the goal of maximizing the number of true beliefs and minimizing the number 
of false beliefs. We know that cannot be right. The proposal that recalibrates our understanding of 
the truth goal toward similarity preserves the importance of true and false beliefs, just as an 
understanding of what is involved in one object being similar to another cannot but give central 
place to the sharing and failing to share of properties. 
 
5. A Unified Goal 
 
In this paper I explored the standard model of the truth goal, drawing out its explicit and implicit 
features, and showed how conceiving of the truth goal this way undermines its potential to ground 
epistemic normativity. I then argued that this model of the truth goal is deeply mistaken and 
defended an alternative way of understanding that goal, one that doesn’t require an appeal to the 
number of truths and falsehoods believed but that nonetheless preserves the central place of true 
and false beliefs. To close the paper, I want to consider whether the truth goal so construed is a 
potential ground of epistemic normativity. To put the question more precisely, I will not here try to 
develop an account of epistemic normativity that is based on this conception of the truth goal. 
Instead, the focus will be on whether the proposed model of the truth goal is one that fractures that 
goal into two, as the standard model does, leaving it unfit to serve as the foundation of epistemic 
normativity. 
At first glance one might think it fares no better in this regard, since it too affirms (as how 
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could it not) the importance of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. True beliefs increase the 
similarity between the world and one’s representation of it, while false beliefs decrease the 
similarity. The goal again has both a positive and negative element, therefore, and moreover these 
again pull in different directions. The positive element is indifferent to risk and urges believing, 
while the negative element is wary of error and cautions restraint. We need, as before, some other 
factor or principle to weight these elements or sub-goals against one another. This alternative 
construal of the truth goal, on this line of thought, may offer a better understanding of that goal, 
but it doesn’t salvage the possibility that the truth goal could serve as the foundation of epistemic 
normativity. 
This response is mistaken, however. Construing the truth goal as a matter of the similarity 
between a representation and what it represents does make intelligible how believing truths and not 
believing falsehoods are part of one unified goal, and moreover a veridic or alethic one at that. The 
parallel with similarity between objects is again instructive. The robots in the first version of the AI 
competition do not have two separate goals, those of creating an object that (i) is as much like the 
cubic mile as possible, while (ii) being as little unlike the cubic mile as possible, where they fulfil 
these distinct goals by giving the objects they create properties the cubic mile has while refraining 
from giving them properties the cubic mile doesn’t have. They have, rather, one goal, that of 
creating an object that is as similar to the cubic mile as possible, and that involves creating an object 
that has properties the cubic mile has and doesn’t have properties that the cubic mile doesn’t have 
(where we remember that some properties make more of a difference than others). In the same 
way, on the model of the truth goal that I have defended, the goal is increasing similarity between a 
representation and what it represents, where believing truly contributes to that and believing falsely 
detracts from that. True belief and false belief on this picture are akin to opposing vector forces, 
with true belief a vector force pushing in the direction of greater similarity and false belief a vector 
force in the opposite direction, pulling away from similarity. Acquiring true belief and avoiding false 
belief, therefore, are oriented in the same direction, toward the same single end. 
It was once orthodoxy that the proper work of the intellect was truth, at least as an unrefined 
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slogan. Over time, the details were filled in, and we moved too quickly from the evident fact that 
both truth and falsehood matter to a picture that rests on implausible assumptions about truth and 
falsehood being countable and about that countability yielding the correct measure on what is true. 
Moreover, this picture fractures the truth goal in a way that leaves it unable to do the job it had 
long been thought to do, namely ground and explain the normative dimensions of belief. The 
alternative I have offered here is intended, principally, to be a better model of the truth goal itself. 
But it also restores the promise of that goal, the potential for that unalloyed goal to be the proper 
work of the intellect. 
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